Abstract This paper evaluates the efficiency of water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) by applying the weighted Russell directional distance model. This is a non-radial data envelopment analysis (DEA) model that allowed us to obtain an individual efficiency score for each input and output considered in the assessment. This study provides a pioneering approach to evaluating the efficiency of WaSCs, since previous studies on this topic were based on radial DEA models that only provide a global efficiency score. Moreover, three variables representing the lack of service quality were introduced into the model as undesirable outputs. An empirical application was carried out for the 25 largest Chilean WaSCs for 2013. The results illustrated that around one-third of the WaSCs in Chile are totally efficient. The inefficiency scores for each variable evidenced that one of the main challenges of the water industry in Chile is to reduce the percentage of unbilled water and that this issue is especially marked for medium WaSCs. As part of the second-stage analysis, some differences in Water Resour Manage (2016) performance between private and concessionary WaSCs were found, although the results were inconclusive. Several policy implications to help water companies' managers and water regulators make informed decisions were drawn from our empirical analysis.
Introduction
The assessment of the efficiency of water and sewerage companies (WaSCs) has proven to be very useful from a managerial and policy perspective (Maziotis et al. 2016; Molinos-Senante et al. 2014a ). This issue is especially marked in regions or countries where the water industry is regulated, such as England and Wales, Portugal, the Netherlands, Chile and so on. Hence, several previous studies have evaluated the efficiency of water companies (Abrate et al. 2016; Guerrini et al. 2013) .
The efficiency assessment of water companies has been performed with different main purposes. In this context, there is increasing interest in introducing service quality issues into the efficiency assessment of water companies. Previous studies have evidenced that ignoring service quality in the evaluation of the performance of WaSCs favours Blow-cost^but lowquality companies while penalizing the ones providing high quality at the expense of higher costs (Kumar and Managi 2010) .
From a methodological point of view, two main approaches have been applied to compute the efficiency of water companies, namely parametric and non-parametric methods. Parametric methods, mainly stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), utilize econometric techniques, while nonparametric methods, such as data envelopment analysis (DEA), use mathematical programming. While both approaches have pros and cons, Berg and Lin (2008) , using a sample of Peruvian water utilities as a case study, concluded that the two approaches yield similar rankings. Within DEA models, a stream of research was developed to integrate undesirable outputs into the efficiency assessment of decision-making units (DMUs). According to Färe et al. (1993) and Chung et al. (1997) , it is considered that the production process carried out by the DMUs not only produces desirable outputs but is accompanied by the simultaneous production of undesirable outputs.
DEA models introducing undesirable outputs have been applied mainly to evaluate the ecoefficiency of several organizations and countries, since CO 2 is considered as undesirable output (Shabani et al. 2014) . However, other undesirable outputs have been considered in efficiency studies. For example, non-performing loans have been introduced as undesirable outputs into the assessment of banks' efficiency (Barros et al. 2012) , as well as the volume of waste generated by ceramic industries (Hernández-Sancho and Sala-Garrido 2008) and the number of accidents when the efficiency of city bus systems is evaluated (Chen et al. 2010) . Because of the great relevance of considering undesirable outputs in the assessment of DMUs' efficiency, the water industry has not escaped this stream of research. Thus, on the one hand, Picazo-Tadeo et al. (2008), De Witte and Marques (2010) and Hernández-Sancho et al. (2012) considered water losses as undesirable outputs in the assessment of the efficiency of water companies in Spain and Portugal. On the other hand, Molinos-Senante et al. (2015a) recently introduced the value of penalties and the number of complaints into the evaluation of the efficiency of a sample of Chilean WaSCs as undesirable outputs.
While the previous studies that included quality variables as undesirable outputs in the assessment of the efficiency of water companies are valid, they have a noticeable shortcoming that limits their use by company managers and water regulators. They followed the traditional DEA approach, that is, a radial approach. This is characterized by adjusting all the variables to efficiency targets by the same proportion (Zhou et al. 2007) , meaning that they only provide a score of global efficiency and therefore information regarding the efficiency of the specific inputs and outputs (desirable and undesirable) involved in the production process cannot be obtained (Zhou et al. 2012) . Moreover, radial DEA models have weaker discriminatory power; therefore, many efficient units cannot be compared and ranked directly. To overcome such limitations, non-radial DEA models were developed. They allow the degree of inefficiency for each input and/or output to be different. This issue is especially relevant in the framework of the water industry, since an inefficiency score is obtained for each input, desirable output and undesirable output considered in the assessment of WaSCs. Hence, company managers and water regulators have valuable information to design and develop specific measures to improve the performance of inefficient water companies. Non-radial efficiency measures definitely have greater discriminatory power in assessing the efficiency of DMUs than radial efficiency measures. Hence, non-radial DEA approaches seem to be more effective in assessing the performance of DMUs (Skevas et al. 2012 ).
Due to their positive features, non-radial DEA models introducing undesirable outputs have recently been applied to evaluate the efficiency of DMUs in several areas, such as banks (Fujii et al. 2014) , coal-fired power firms (Wei et al. 2015) and farms (Skevas et al. 2012) . However, to the best of our knowledge, non-radial DEA models accounting for service quality variables have never been applied to evaluate the efficiency of WaSCs.
To overcome this gap in the literature, the main objective of this paper was to evaluate the efficiency of a sample of WaSCs, obtaining not only a global score of inefficiency but an individual inefficiency score for each input, desirable output and service quality variable introduced into the efficiency assessment. In doing so, we applied the weighted Russell directional distance model (WRDDM), which is a nonradial DEA model developed by Chen et al. (2010) and Barros et al. (2012) . In particular, we carried out an empirical application in the Chilean water industry for 2013 considering three service quality variables, namely unbilled water, failure to meet drinking water requirements and failure to meet wastewater treatment requirements. Hence, our paper provides a considerably deeper analysis of the paper by MolinosSenante et al. (2015a) by estimating how individual service quality variables affect water companies' efficiency. As the second-stage analysis, we explored whether the ownership of the WaSCs affects the inefficiency scores of each previously computed input, desirable output and undesirable output.
This paper contributes to the current strand of literature in the field of WaSCs' performance assessment by employing for the first time the WRDDM. It is a non-radial DEA model and therefore, the assessment provides not just a global efficiency score, as previous studies, but an individual score of inefficiency for each input, desirable output and undesirable output involved in the model. It should be highlighted that despite a few previous studies having evaluated the performance of WaSCs, including service quality, none of them have considered the unbilled water, failure in drinking water requirements and failure in wastewater treatment requirements as quality of service variables. Hence, this study provides a pioneering and novel approach to evaluating the efficiency in the service quality of WaSCs. Moreover, this study provides insights into the impact of the ownership of WaSCs on their efficiency. We consider these topics to be very relevant and deserving of investigation.
From a managerial and policy perspective, obtaining an inefficiency score for each variable introduced into the assessment model provides water company managers and policy makers with essential information. The results obtained allow us to identify the variables in which WaSCs operate inefficiently. In other words, the results of this study allow us to identify which factor(s) the water companies need to improve the most compared with their peers. This information is essential to improve the performance of WaSCs, since water managers should implement different strategies to improve efficiency depending on which factors are inefficient. Moreover, since our assessment considers service quality variables, the results would be very useful for national water regulators during the water price review process (Pinto and Marques 2016) . Alternatively, inefficiency measures can serve as a basis on which to design and implement incentives to improve the service quality for customers.
Methodology
To estimate an inefficiency score for each input, desirable output and undesirable output used in the provision of water and sewerage services (WSSs) by water companies, we applied the WRDDM. This model was introduced by Chen et al. (2010) and subsequently developed by Barros et al. (2012) and Fujii et al. (2014) . The WRDDM is based on the directional distance function combined with a non-radial DEA approach (Wei et al. 2015) . It is considered that water companies use a vector of inputs x∈R N þ to produce two kinds of outputs -desirable outputs and undesirable outputs -which are denoted by the vectors y∈R The directional distance function seeking to increase the desirable outputs and decrease the undesirable outputs and inputs directionally can be defined by the following (Molinos-Senante et al. 2015b) :
where the vector g ¼ g x ; g y ; g b determines the directions in which inputs, desirable outputs and undesirable outputs are scaled. The directional distance function gives the expansion in desirable outputs and contraction in undesirable outputs and inputs together. A DMU is efficient when D x; y; b; g ð Þ¼0. This means that no additional improvements in desirable outputs, undesirable outputs and inputs are feasible. In contrast, when D x; y; b; g ð Þ> 0, it means that the DMU is inefficient (Barros et al. 2012) .
The technology reference set is given by:
Suppose that there are k ¼ 1; …; K DMUs (WaSCs in our case study) and each one uses inputs
where ρ kË C is the weighted inefficiency score and β kË C n , β kË C m and β kË C j are the individual inefficiency scores for inputs, desirable outputs and undesirable outputs, respectively. This is one of the main positive features of the WRDDM, since it enables not only a total inefficiency score of each water company to be obtained, but also an inefficiency score for each of the inputs, the desirable outputs and the undesirable outputs considered in the analysis. Hence, this model can assist water companies' operators and water authorities in finding the source of the greatest possible improvement. z k are the intensity variables to expand or shrink the individual observed activities of k to construct linear combinations of the observed inputs and outputs. The coefficients ϖ n ; ϖ m; ϖ j are the weights assigned to each input, desirable output and undesirable output involved in the assessment. They are associated with the priorities given to the inputs and outputs (desirable and undesirable) and their sum is normalized to unity.
In some productive processes, there are no priorities for the inputs and outputs (desirable and undesirable), but all of them have the same importance. In this case, the coefficients ϖ n ; ϖ m; ϖ j are assigned depending on the cardinal for each set of inputs, desirable outputs and undesirable outputs. Moreover, since the objective of water companies is to reduce the inputs and undesirable outputs and to increase the desirable outputs, the vector g ¼ g x ; g y ; g b is defined as
Taking these premises into account, model (3) can be rewritten as follows:
In the efficiency assessment of a set of units (water companies in our case), it is essential to select the correct approach regarding the assumption of the form of production technology of the units. It can be constant returns to scale (CRS) or variable returns to scale (VRS). The CRS approach assumes that all DMUs operate at the optimum level regarding their size. MolinosSenante et al. (2015a) illustrated that Chilean WaSCs operate under CRS technology; therefore, as shown in Eqs. (3) and (4), we estimated the efficiency of WaSCs in Chile under the assumption of CRS. Nevertheless, to compute efficiency scores assuming VRS technology, the convexity constraint ∑ K k¼1 z k ¼ 1 should be added to Eqs. (3) and (4).
3 Case Study
Description of the Water Industry in Chile
Chile is a middle-income country in which the water industry is marked by two major issues. The first one is the ownership of the water companies, since in 1998 the Chilean water industry was privatized. Two approaches were implemented to privatize the water companies: (i) the privatization of public WSSs, which means that some public WaSCs sold participation to private consortia and therefore a significant part of the capital of the main water companies was privatized (Molinos-Senante et al. 2015a); and (ii) the privatization of the exploitation of WSSs, which means transferring the rights for the exploitation of the WaSCs to the private sector for a fixed term (30 years). As a result of the privatization, 95.7 % of Chilean citizens are currently supplied by private water companies (SISS 2013) . The privatization of the Chilean water industry involved a new regulatory system managed by the BSuperintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios^(SISS), which is the national water regulator (only for urban areas). It should be highlighted that the Chilean water industry has made some noticeable progress in the past two decades by increasing the coverage of WSSs and the quality of the service provided. Nevertheless, parts of the water industry in Chile face important challenges, such as the provision of WSSs in rural areas, the high percentage of water losses, the poor treatment of wastewater and the introduction of environmental criteria (mainly water scarcity) into the water tariff.
Sample and Data Description
In Chile, as in many other countries, there are three types of water companies, namely WaSCs, water-only companies and sewerage-only companies. The sample assessed in this paper consists of the 25 main Chilean WaSCs for 2013 which provide WSSs to about 99.4 % of the total urban customers. The source of data is the management report about WSSs published by the SISS on its web page.
Previous studies that assessed the performance of Chilean WaSCs (Molinos-Senante and Sala-Garrido 2015; Molinos-Senante et al. 2015a) selected the following inputs: (i) operating costs x 1 ð Þ expressed in Chilean pesos, which involve the total operating expenditure except labour costs; (ii) labour x 2 ð Þ measured as the total number of workers of the WaSC; and (iii) network length x 3 ð Þ expressed in kilometres, which is the sum of the delivery and sewerage networks. Hence, following the past evidence for our case study, we selected these three inputs.
Regarding the selection of the desirable outputs, it should be noted that our assessment focused on WSSs (including wastewater treatment services) and therefore the desirable outputs should consider both services. Hence, we followed the approach suggested by MolinosSenante and Sala-Garrido (2015) , who selected two desirable outputs: (i) water distributed y 1 ð Þ expressed in thousands of cubic metres, which is a measure of the volume of water treated and put into the delivery network and therefore does not consider water leaks; and (ii) the number of customers with access to wastewater treatment services y 2 ð Þ. It should be noted that one of the main challenges of the Chilean water industry is to improve the coverage of wastewater treatment services.
The choice of the variables representing the lack of service quality, that is, the undesirable outputs, depends mainly on the aim of the study. Previous studies have considered a wide variety of quality variables, such as service coverage, service continuity, water receiving chemical treatment, water losses, water quality and unaccounted for water (e.g. De Witte and Marques 2010; Hernández-Sancho et al. 2012; Mbuvi et al. 2012) . However, taking into account the main challenges of the water industry in Chile, we considered that other variables are more suitable and objective to introduce the service quality issues into the assessment of the WaSCs efficiency. Thus, the following variables were selected as undesirable outputs. (i) Unbilled water j 1 ð Þ expressed as the percentage of the distributed water that is unbilled. It involves both leakages and water theft. In Chile, in the process to set water tariffs, the SISS assumes a maximum percentage of leakages of 20 %; therefore, higher values are considered as inefficiency in the water supply process. Moreover, Molinos-Senante et al. (2015a) concluded that in Chilean WaSCs, the percentage of unbilled water is a factor affecting their efficiency. (ii) Failure to meet the drinking quality requirements j 2 ð Þ expressed as a percentage. (iii) Failure to meet the wastewater treatment requirements j 3 ð Þ expressed as a percentage. Table 1 provides a snapshot of the statistical data used to compute the inefficiency scores for each input, desirable output and undesirable output. Moreover, the great correlation between inputs and desirable outputs (values close to one) and between inputs and undesirable outputs (negative or near zero values) should be highlighted (see the supplemental material).
Results and Discussion
The WRDDM was applied to obtain an inefficiency score for each variable introduced into the efficiency assessment. Table 2 shows the inefficiency scores for individual inputs and outputs (desirable and undesirable) for WaSCs grouped according to their size. The Chilean Law of Water and Sewerage Services classifies WaSCs according to their size based on their percentage of customers in relation to the total WSS customers in Chile. Large WaSCs are the ones that provide WSSs to a percentage of customers equal to or larger than 15 % of the total national amount. Medium WaSCs provide services to a percentage of customers that ranges between 4 and 15 % of the total national amount, and small WaSCs provide WSSs to less than 4 % of the national total of customers. Table 2 illustrates that all large WaSCs are efficient in the use of inputs, in the generation of desirable outputs and in the quality of the service provided to customers. This excellent performance is not evidenced for medium WaSCs, since none of them are totally efficient. The results illustrate that these water companies are especially inefficient, on average, in the service quality provided to customers. Thus, none of the medium WaSCs is efficient regarding unbilled water and the quality of the drinking water. It is also evidenced that, on average, Chilean medium water companies have significant room to reduce the number of workers if these WaSCs are compared with the efficient ones in the use of this input. Finally, 6 out of 19 (32 %) small WaSCs are totally efficient in the use of inputs and the generation of outputs (desirable and undesirable). This finding means that the performance of some small WaSCs is as good as that of the large WaSCs. Nevertheless, the inefficiency scores shown in Table 2 highlight that the main challenge that small WaSCs face in increasing their efficiency is to improve the service quality by reducing unbilled water and the number of failures to meet the drinking water and wastewater treatment requirements established by the Chilean water regulator (SISS).
To check whether the observed differences in the inefficiency scores between the three groups of water companies (large, medium and small) are statistically significant, the nonparametric test of Kruskal-Wallis was performed. The null hypothesis is that the inefficiency scores of the three groups of WaSCs are not different from a statistical point of view. If the pvalue of the Kruskal-Wallis test is smaller than 0.05, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 95 % level of significance. Specifically, eight Kruskal-Wallis tests were carried out, one for each variable x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ; y 1 ; y 2 ; j 1 ; j 2 ; j 3 ð Þ considered in the efficiency assessment. Table 3 shows that the p-value is smaller than 0.05 only for the variable Bnetwork length^. This result means that, except for the network length, the differences in the inefficiency scores between large, medium and small WaSCs are not statistically significant. This is an important finding from a managerial and policy perspective, since it is evidenced that the efficiency of Chilean water companies does not depend on their size. Hence, WaSCs cannot improve their performance by merging. Moreover, these results support the idea that the water regulator (SISS) should not promote horizontal integration. While there is some controversy about the presence of economies of scale in water companies Tsagarakis (2013) for water companies in Brazil, Norway and Poland. Table 4 shows the inefficiency scores for each input, desirable output and undesirable output as well as the total inefficiency at the water company level. To ease their interpretation, values indicating efficiency in the use of inputs or in the generation of outputs (desirable and undesirable) are shaded as grey boxes. The table illustrates that 8 out of 25 WaSCs have an inefficiency score equal to 0.0. This means that 32 % of the evaluated water companies are efficient in the use of inputs, the production of outputs and the quality of the service provided to their customers. These 8 WaSCs comprise the benchmark of the best practice. This figure is consistent with the results reported by Molinos-Senante et al. (2015a) , who concluded that for 2012, 28 % of the Chilean WaSCs were efficient. Nevertheless, it should be noted that different desirable outputs and undesirable outputs were considered in the two studies.
As reported in the introduction and methodology sections, from a managerial and policy perspective, one of the main advantages of the WRDDM is that it allows us to obtain an inefficiency score for each variable introduced into the model to assess the efficiency of the water companies. This information is essential to design specific measures to improve the efficiency of WaSCs at the water company level and consequently to improve the performance of the water industry as a whole. Regarding the use of inputs, it is illustrated that 8 out of 25 WaSCs (32 %) are efficient, meaning that these water companies cannot reduce the use of the inputs considered in the assessment to produce their desirable outputs while also maintaining the quality of the service for customers. Within the inputs, labour, that is, the number of workers employed by WaSCs, is the one with the largest inefficiency score. This finding means that within inputs, labour is the item for which Chilean water companies have the largest room for improvement. This issue is especially prominent for some particular WaSCs, such as WaSC20, WaSC16 or WaSC10. Table 4 shows that 32 % of the Chilean WaSCs evaluated are also efficient in the generation of desirable outputs. Actually, the water companies that are efficient in the use of inputs are also the ones that are efficient in the production of desirable outputs and undesirable outputs; consequently, they are the WaSCs that are totally efficient. If we compare the inefficiency scores of the two desirable outputs, it is apparent that they are fairly similar, since 40 % of the WaSCs are efficient in the volume of water distributed and 36 % of the WaSCs are efficient in the number of customers with access to wastewater treatment. Nevertheless, the results evidence that for all the water companies except WaSC20, the inefficiency score regarding the water supply service is larger than the one associated with the wastewater treatment service. This finding highlights the significant efforts that water companies in Chile are making to improve the coverage of wastewater treatment services.
Finally, as reported previously, 8 out of the 25 water companies evaluated are efficient regarding quality issues. These water companies are the ones that provide their customers with the best service in comparison with the other WaSCs assessed. Hence, they can be considered as references for the inefficient WaSCs regarding the quality of the service provided to customers. Within the three variables representative of the service quality, Table 4 illustrates that almost 50 % of the water companies (12 out of 25) are efficient in relation to the quality of the wastewater treatment service. In other words, these water companies have such a low number of failures regarding the wastewater treatment requirements that they are identified as efficient water companies in relation to this item. Regarding the other two quality variables, that is, unbilled water and failure to meet the drinking water requirements, only the WaSCs that are totally efficient (8 out of 25) are efficient in both items. This indicates that around twothirds of the evaluated WaSCs have room to improve their performance in relation to these two quality variables. We would like to emphasize that the fact that a water company is identified as efficient does not mean that its performance is Bperfect^or that it cannot improve it. The estimation of efficiency using the DEA approach is a relative measure in the sense that the performances of the DMUs evaluated are compared. This issue is especially relevant to unbilled water, since, according to Table 4 , 8 out of 25 WaSCs were identified as efficient for this item. However, only 5 water companies have a percentage of unbilled water lower than 20 %, which is the reference value established by the SISS to set water tariffs. Moreover, some of the water companies identified as efficient in relation to drinking water requirements are not exempt from failures both in frequency sampling and in the concentration of some pollutants. Hence, while efficient WaSCs are the best in comparison with the inefficient companies, they still have the possibility to improve their performance.
Following the privatization of the water industry in Chile, there are three groups of water companies: (i) private WaSCs that acquired the lifetime right to the provision of WSSs by buying shares in the public WaSCs, which we name private WaSCs; (ii) private companies that acquired the right to the provision of WSSs for an established period of time, that is, WaSCs that operate under a concession (concessionary WaSCs); and (iii) public WaSCs, which correspond to public concessionaries, municipalities or cooperatives.
To assess whether the ownership of WaSCs influences the inefficiency scores for inputs, desirable outputs and undesirable outputs, the sample of Chilean WaSCs was separated into three groups: (i) fully private WaSCs; (ii) concessionary WaSCs; and (iii) public WaSCs. Subsequently, the non-parametric test of Kruskal-Wallis was applied to test for statistically significant differences among the groups of WaSCs in relationship to the group inefficiency scores. If the level of significance was less than 0.05, the null hypothesis that the K samples were derived from the same population was rejected.
Firstly, we investigated whether the inefficiency scores of the three inputs considered in the assessment are statistically different among the three groups of WaSCs according to their ownership. Table 5 illustrates that water companies that operate under a concession are the most inefficient in the use of the three inputs and their inefficiency is especially marked for operating costs. Nevertheless, the Kruskal-Wallis test did not lead us to reject the hypothesis of equality of means for inefficiency scores at the 95 % significance level. This finding means that the efficiency in the use of inputs is not affected by the ownership of the WaSCs.
The average inefficiency scores in the production of desirable outputs for the three groups of WaSCs are shown in Table 5 . It is illustrated that the public WaSCs are also the ones with the best performance on this topic, since they present the lowest average inefficiency scores. In contrast with the use of inputs, for the generation of desirable outputs, private WaSCs have worse performance than concessionary WaSCs. In spite of this, the Kruskal-Wallis test values indicate that the inefficiency differences among public WaSCs, private WaSCs and concessionary WaSCs are not statistically significant. Table 5 shows the average inefficiency scores for the quality variables. Focusing on the comparison of the private WaSCs and the concessionary WaSCs, it should be noted that private companies are more efficient regarding unbilled water and failure to meet the drinking water requirements. On the other hand, concessionary WaSCs present better performance in relation to the efficiency in the failure to meet wastewater treatment requirements. As a result, public WaSCs are the best while concessionary WaSCs are the worst regarding service quality efficiency. The results in Table 5 illustrate that the differences in the mean inefficiency for the three groups of WaSCs assessed are not statistically significant. This finding means that the ownership of water companies in Chile does not affect their service quality. Total inefficiency is a synthetic indicator of the performance of the WaSCs, which takes into account the use of inputs and the generation of desirable outputs and undesirable outputs. Thus, it is not surprising that the group of public WaSCs is the one with the best performance. Nonetheless, it cannot be concluded emphatically which group of water companies (private or concessionary) is more efficient. Moreover, the p-value of the Kruskal-Wallis test is 0.301, meaning that the mean inefficiency differences for the groups of WaSCs according to their ownership are not statistically significant.
The assessment carried out in this second-stage analysis has provided some preliminary insights into the efficiency differences between public and concessionary WaSCs. This information is essential for water regulators, since it allows them to identify the most suitable privatization model in terms of water companies' efficiency . Hence, it would be very interesting to conduct future research on this issue.
Conclusions
The efficiency assessment of water companies has proven to be very useful both for companies' managers and for water authorities. Hence, several previous studies have been carried out with the aim of evaluating the performance of WaSCs. However, from a methodological point of view, they have followed a radial DEA approach, meaning that they only provide a global score of efficiency. This synthetic information limits the use of the results by water companies, since it is unknown which variables are more appropriate to act on to improve the performance. To overcome such a limitation, we applied the WRDDM to evaluate the performance of a sample of WaSCs. The WRDDM is a non-radial DEA model that allowed us to obtain an individual inefficiency score for each input and output considered in the assessment. Moreover, recognizing the great importance of improving the service quality of WSSs, three variables representing the lack of service quality were introduced into the efficiency evaluation as undesirable outputs. Hence, this paper provides a pioneering approach to evaluating the efficiency of WaSCs. Finally, the second-stage analysis was carried out to investigate whether the ownership of the WaSCs affects their performance.
The empirical application carried out was focused on the 25 largest Chilean WaSCs for 2013. The results provide the following primary findings: (i) 8 out of 25 Chilean WaSCs (32 %) are totally efficient, that is, they are efficient in the use of inputs, the generation of desirable outputs and the service quality provided; (ii) the differences in the inefficiency scores between large, medium and small WaSCs are not statistically significant; (iii) none of the medium WaSCs in Chile are totally efficient and they have significant room to improve their service quality; (iv) the performance of some small WaSCs is as good as that of the large WaSCs; (v) public WaSCs have better performance than private and concessionary WaSCs, although the differences are not statistically significant; and (vi) private WaSCs exhibit better performance on operational costs and failure to meet the drinking water requirements than concessionary WaSCs. The opposite situation occurs for the access to wastewater treatment services.
From a policy perspective, the findings of this study are of great interest for water regulators and water companies' managers. First, the computation of an inefficiency score for each variable (input, desirable output and undesirable output) involved in the efficiency model allows water companies to design and implement specific measures to improve their performance. Moreover, it allows to the water regulator to identify the main challenges of the water industry at the national level. Second, the introduction of service quality issues into the assessment of the efficiency of WaSCs provides relevant information to the water regulator to set water tariffs for each WaSC according to the service quality that it provides to its customers. Third, the main challenge of the Chilean water industry is to improve its service quality. In particular, WaSCs and the water regulator should introduce measures to promote the reduction in the percentage of unbilled water and the percentage of failures to achieve the drinking water requirements. Fourth, there are some differences between the performances of the private and concessionary WaSCs in Chile. However, these differences are inconclusive for most of the variables; therefore, future research on this issue should be carried out. In conclusion, this study provides a scientific baseline on which to improve the performance and the service quality of the Chilean water industry.
